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STATE OF UTAH 






STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's Statement 
of the Case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. The verdict and judg-
ment were in favor of the plaintiff. The jury awarded 
the plaintiff $3,327.56 for special damages, $13,488.36 for 
lost earnings and $10,000.00 as general damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests that the judgment 
I Case No. 
| 13696 
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rendered by the lower court be affirmed and that the 
Respondent be awarded her costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 27, 1971, the plaintiff and the defendant 
were traveling in separate cars from West to East on 
U. S. Highway 50 and 6. The weather was clear but 
windy. The roads were dry. About 5 miles northwest 
of Green River, Utah, both parties encountered severe 
wind storms carrying dust and debris. 
The plaintiff proceeded through a small dust storm 
which quickly passed. The plaintiff then immediately 
entered a second dust storm. This storm reduced the 
plaintiff's visibility to virtually zero. In response, the 
plaintiff reduced her speed to about 5 mph.. 
The defendant passed through the first storm and 
entered the second storm at approximately 50 mph. The 
defendant smashed into the rear end of the plaintiff's 
car ramming it forward into the rear end of a third ve-
hicle. 
The plaintiff's car burst into flame. The plaintiff's 
husband, a passenger, was killed. The defendant pulled 
the plaintiff from the burning wreckage. The plaintiff 
brought this action as a response to recover some of her 
damages suffered in the above-described accident. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
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REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION 
ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
The appellant asserts that the trial judge inadvert-
ently failed to give the instruction on unavoidable acci-
dent. That is just not the case. The appellant relies on 
the trial judge's statement, "I think that I shall give an 
instruction on contributory negligence and also on un-
avoidable accident and let them mull both of those over." 
(Transcript, p. 332, lines 29-30; p. 333, 1.) 
This comment came in chambers as part of a dis-
cussion of a series of motions to limit the issues to be 
submitted to the jury. The comment was made prior to 
the presentation of argument by plaintiff's counsel and 
consideration of the authorities submitted for plaintiff's 
position. The trial judge concluded the discussion in 
chambers by referring to one of the authorities submitted 
by plaintiff's counsel. 
I haven't had a chance to read it yet, 
(Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 80, 335 P. 2d 66), 
this was just submitted to me a few moments 
ago just before lunch, and I haven't had a chance 
to read it, then I will determine whether this is 
a proper instruction. (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 
p. 333, 17-22.) 
It is abundantly clear that the trial judge's refusal to 
give the instruction on unavoidable accident was not in-
advertent. It was done on the strength of the argument 
and submitted authorities offered by palintiff's counsel. 
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The heart of the concept of unavoidable accident is 
that the accident was of such a nature that it occurred 
without being the proximate result of anyone's negli-
gence. The instruction requested by the defendant ex-
presses this same idea. 
The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. 
An unavoidable accident is one which occurs in 
such a manner that it cannot justly be said to 
have been proximately caused by negligence as 
those terms are herein defined. In the event a •• 
party is damaged by an unavoidable accident, 
he has no right to recover, since the law requires 
that a person be injured by the fault or negli-
gence of another as a prerequisite to any right 
to recover damages. J. I. F. U. 16.1. 
In Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 352, 366 P. 
2d 701 (1961), this Court laid out the considerations rele-
vant to deciding whether or not an instruction on unavoid-
able accident is necessary. 
[1] When the error assigned is the giving 
or failure to give instructions, the real inquiry 
should be were the issues of fact necessary to 
be determined, and the principles of law applic-
able thereto, correctly presented to the jury in 
a clear and understandable manner? That is the 
purpose of instruction and if it is accomplished, 
the failure to give additional ones is not of con- \ 
trolling importance. In this case the court told 
the jury in clear and unmistakable language that 
there could be no recovery unless plaintiff proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendant was negligent and such negligence proxi-
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mately caused the accident, which terms were 
properly defined and related to the specific acts 
of negligence charged. The only possible mean-
ing and effect of this instruction was to advise 
the jury that they could not find for the plain-
tiff, if the occurrence was an unavoidable acci-
dent. This is an adequate answer to the plain-
tiff's complaint about the failure to instruct on 
the subject of unavoidable accident. 
This statement is controlling in the present case. The 
concept embodied in unavoidable accident is that the 
plaintiff cannot recover unless the defendant is found 
to have been negligent and that his negligence was the 
proximate cause of the accident. The jury was amply 
instructed in this concept. 
Instruction No. 12 clearly carries the same impact. 
"The mere fact that an accident happened, considered 
alone, does not support an inference that any party to 
this action was negligent." Instructions No. 2, 4, 5, and 
13 all contribute to this idea that recovery cannot take 
place without a showing of negligence on the part of the 
defendant. The conclusion is inescapable that the jury 
was adequately instructed in the matter of unavoidable 
accident and that the trial judge did not err in refusing 
to give the defendant's requested instruction. 
The facts of the present case also lead inexorably 
to the conclusion that the issue of unavoidable accident 
is not involved here any more than in practically any 
other accident case. The hazardous road conditions 
should have put the defendant on his guard that exces-
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sive speed would be dangerous. The defendant testified 
that he saw the tail lights of a car through the storm. 
He, of course, was aware of the dangers of crashing into 
the rear end of another car and the difficulties involved 
in bringing his car to a stop "and the consequent neces-
sity of keeping a safe distance and a close watch on the 
cars ahead. Thus, there was ample basis to find him 
negligent, and only the ordinary indication of an un-
avoidable accident." Wellman, supra, at Utah 2d 353. 
POINT II. 
THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE JURORS IN 
THIS CASE COULD NOT BE SUBMITTED 
TO IMPEACH THEIR VERDICT. 
It has been the long standing rule of law in virtually 
every jurisdiction that jurors cannot impeach their own 
verdict except where special types of misconduct occur. 
This Court dealt with the rule of law in Utah at length in 
the well-reasoned opinion in Wheat v. Denver & R. G. 
W. R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P. 2d 932, 936-7 (1952). 
[7] The question first to consider in re-
gard to this alleged misconduct of the jury is 
whether this evidence presented to the court, 
both the affidavits and the oral testimony, was 
competent and admissible. With certain excep-
tions, a juror's affidavit is inadmissible to im-
peach the jury's verdict. In the case of People 
v. Ritchie, (12 Utah 180, 42 P. 209, 212. See also 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772, 
Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 
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Utah 205, 91 P. 2d 507), this court adopted the 
California interpretation concerning the statu-
tory enumeration of grounds for a new trial, our 
former statute having been taken from and iden-
tical with their code. The construction involved 
is that because the statute enumerated a single 
circumstance (chance verdict) where miscon-
duct of the jury could be proved by the affidavit 
of a juror, under the maxim "expressio unius, 
exclusio alterius", it is implied that in no other 
cases could evidence of other misconduct be 
proved by such affidavits. Rule 59, U. R. C. P., 
now supplants the statute and is identical, in the 
parts here pertinent, with the former statutory 
provision except that bribery has been added to 
chance verdicts as a ground that may be shown 
by a juror's affidavit in seeking a new trial. 
The rule prohibiting jurors from impeaching 
their verdict is founded on sound reasoning and 
has long been recognized. In People v. Flynn 
(7 Utah 378, 26 P. 1114, 1116), we said: 
"It is well settled that affidavits of 
jurors will not be received to impeach or 
question their verdict, nor to show the 
grounds upon which is was rendered, nor to 
show their misunderstanding of fact or law, 
nor that they misunderstood the charge of 
the court, or the effect of their verdict, nor 
their opinions, surmises, and processes of 
reasoning in arriving at a verdict." 
The policy behind this statement applies 
with equal cogency to the oral evidence of jur-
ors proffered upon a hearing of a motion for a 
new trial. To permit litigants to get jurors to 
sign affidavits or testify to matters discussed in 
connection with their functions as jurors would 
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open the door to inquiry into all manner of things 
which a losing litigant might consider improper; 
misconceptions of evidence or law, offers of set-
tlement, personal experiences, prejudice against 
litigants or their causes or the classes to which 
they belong. It would be an interminable and 
totally impracticable process. Such post mor-
tems would be productive of no end of mischief 
and render service of a juror unbearable. If 
jurors were so circumscribed in their delibera-
tions, it is likely that judge and counsel would 
have to be present in the jury room attempting 
to monitor and regulate their thought and dis-
cussions into approved channels. Fortunately, 
jurors are under no such limitation, but are 
allowed freedom in their deliberations. As this 
court wrote in Ogden L. & I. Railway Company 
v. Jones (51 Utah 62, 168 P. 548, 551, 250 P. 2d 
— 59%: 
"It is elementary that a juror may not 
be heard to impeach his own verdict. * * * 
The law, * * * wisely provides that a 
juror may not disclose facts which would 
go in impeachment of his verdict * * *" 
which thought is affirmed by the eminent author-
ity, Mr. Wigmore, who writes, "* * * the 
verdict as uttered is the sole embodiment of the 
jury's action as such without regard to the mo-
tives or beliefs which have led up to their act." 
(8 Wigmore, Evidence (1940) 668). 
[8] Both the affidavits and the oral testi-
mony offered being incompetent, there exists 
no basis for considering whether the jury was 
in fact guilty of any misconduct which would 
have required the granting of a new trial. 
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There are no exceptional circumstances in the present 
case that would justify deviation from the established 
rule of law. Appellant argues that certain statements 
were made in rereading the jury instructions in the jury 
room that confused six of the jurors. This Court had 
dealt with this type of situation in Cooper v. Evans, 1 
Utah 2d 68, 262 P. 2d 278 (1953). 
It is suggested that there is substance to the 
foregoing contention because when the trial court 
advised the jury of the judgment required by 
their findings, several members of the jury voiced 
disapproval, claiming they had misunderstood; 
and that the result was not as they desired. 
Upon the motion for a new trial, proof of such 
misunderstanding was proffered in affidavit 
for. These latter matters, including the proof 
by affidavit, were properly disregarded. Jurors 
may not thus impeach their own verdict because 
of disappointment or even confusion. (Utah 2d 
70, citations deleted, emphasis added. See also 
Hathaway v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33, 439 P. 2d 850 
(1968). 
It is abundantly clear that the affidavits of five of the 
jurors are not admissible for purposes of impeaching the 
verdict rendered, nor to show the grounds upon which 
the verdict was rendered, or other circumstances sur-
rounding it, and such a rule is applicable to this appeal. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS ON 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE W E R E 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
CLEAR AND DID NOT PREJUDICE THE 
DEFENDANT IN ANY WAY. 
The concept of contributory negligence was given 
to the jury in Instruction No. 3. That Instruction was 
supplemented by statements in Instruction No. 1 and 
by the definition of negligence and proximate cause in 
Instruction No. 2. The test to be applied by the jury 
was "what a reasonable and prudent person would have 
done under the circumstances." 
The appellant claims that the trial judge's failure 
to give J. I. F. U. Instruction 2.5 was reversible error. The 
only difference between the Instruction given and the 
J. I. F. U. Instruction is that the J. I. F. U. Instruction 
states with particularity what would have constituted 
contributory negligence. Appellant claims that by right, 
he should have had the jury so instructed. It is clear 
from the record what specific acts that were entered into 
evidence could have been particularly stated as constitut-
ing contributory negligence. 
The trial judge asked counsel for the defendant what 
evidence there was from which the jury could find con-
tributory negligence. 
MR. MANGAN: It may be the circum-
stance of an unavoidable accident or it may be 
contributory negligence. It is a matter which 
you may have to rule on as a matter of law, but 
I feel that Mrs. Stringham going into a storm 
and being in it five minutes and the density 
that she had where she couldn't see the car in 
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front of her, the Fish and Game couldn't see the 
car in front of them, and to continue to proceed 
along at five miles an hour was a situation where 
they were opening not only themselves but others 
to hazard who may not know what the situation 
was. I think that she should have gotten off the 
road. I think that a reasonable prudent person 
would have gotten off the road, especially where 
they had the space that road had. 
MR. HOWARD: Well, that isn't a suffi-
cient charge of negligence. She says when she 
answered my question she thought it was safer 
to go ahead. If the argument were sound that 
she were to get off the road or shouldn't do what 
she did then everyone on the highway that day 
was guilty of negligence. On the other hand, if 
we had driven our car or everyone had driven 
their car like Mr. Broderick drove his, why the 
fish and game people would have been in the 
back of the car in front of them, we would have 
struck the Fish and Game people going at fifty 
miles an hour. (Tr. p. 330,1. 26, to p. 331,1. 20.) 
It is inconceivable that the trial judge would instruct 
the jury that as a matter of law the plaintiff was negli-
gent if she did not pull off of the road. The only other 
possibility for contributory negligence was that raised by 
the trial judge. "Now I wonder if she slowed down too 
abruptly." (Tr. 332, 1. 2.) As counsel for the defendant 
admitted, "We have no evidence as to how she slowed 
down other than her testimony and so it is the only thing 
available." (Tr. p. 332,1. 7.) It is clear that no evidence 
or unreasonable inferences were suggested to the trial 
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court that would lead to specific definition of acts that 
would constitute contributory negligence. 
Notwithstanding the Court's correct action in not 
giving any instruction on contributory negligence due to 
a complete lack of any such evidence in the record never-
theless defendant's counsel obstinately and erroneously 
argued contributory negligence in his closing remarks 
to the jury therefore the defendant can't complain in-
asmuch as he actually succeeded in getting his message 
to the jury. 
The appellant offers Flippen v. Millward, 120 Utah 
373, 234 P. 2d 1053 (1953), as supporting his claim of 
error in failing to give the requested instruction. This 
case is not controlling nor applicable to this appeal. The 
posture on appeal of the Flippen case is the exact opposite 
of that in the present case. There, the plaintiff is appeal-
ing an adverse judgment on the basis that an instruction 
given by the trial court was not warranted under the 
facts. The instruction was: 
You are instructed that no person shall sud-
denly decrease speed of a vehicle without first 
giving an appropriate signal which would indi-
cate to a driver immediately to the rear that said 
vehicle was going to decrease its speed; and if 
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff suddenly decreased her speed upon said 
highway without giving a signal that could be 
seen and observed by a driver in the rear and 
that her failure to give such signal in sufficient 
time to warn defendant caused or contributed to 
the accident and the resulting injuries, if any, 
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then you verdict shall be in favor of defendant 
on plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action, (120 
Utah 374) 
This Court held that there was evidence offered at trial 
from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
From the evidence we have outlined above 
a jury could have reasonably found that if 
both appellant's and respondent's testimony were 
true as to the rate of speed their cars were trav-
eling prior to the accident that the accident 
could not have occured unless appellant had 
either suddenly stopped or suddenly decreased 
her speed. While it is true, as contended by ap-
pellant that no one directly testified that she 
suddenly slowed up without signalling, there is 
evidence from which the jury could reasonably 
infer that she did so and therefore the court prop-
erly instructed as it did. (120 Utah 376.) 
Even with the court upholding the action of the trial 
court, it did say that the instruction was poor. The trial 
judge would have better instructed the jury if he had 
phrased his instruction in terms of the evidence; 
namely that the plaintiff did not have brake lights on 
the car. 
Under these circumstances, it would have 
been better had the court instructed that un-
less her car was equipped with a stop light sig-
nal which she could and did use it would have 
been negligent for her to suddenly stop or de-
crease her speed. (120 Utah 376.) 
This case does not support the position of the Appellant, 
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but rather, stands for the proposition that the verdict 
and judgment of the trial court should be upheld on 
appeal whenever there exists substantial evidence sup-
porting the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff-respondent contends that the trial judge 
was correct in his instructions to the jury and that the 
jury reached a correct verdict. A special instruction lay-
ing out unavoidable accident would have been redundant 
and would have overly emphasized defendant's version 
of the case. 
The appellant is incorrect in asking this Court to 
consider affidavits of jurors as evidence in support of 
impeachment of their verdict. The appellant was not 
prejudiced by the trial judge's failure to give J. I. F. U. 
2.5. There was no evidence offered that would have justi-
fied such an instruction. The appellant had his view of the 
case represented to the jury on contributory negligence 
in Instructions 1, 2 and 3. 
The plaintiff-respondent respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the verdict and judgment of the trial 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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